The circumstances of the British iron and steel industry, through depression and recovery, 1919 – 1939, with particular reference to the problem of location by King, D. I.
Durham E-Theses
The circumstances of the British iron and steel
industry, through depression and recovery, 1919  1939,
with particular reference to the problem of location
King, D. I.
How to cite:
King, D. I. (1949) The circumstances of the British iron and steel industry, through depression and
recovery, 1919  1939, with particular reference to the problem of location, Durham theses, Durham
University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/10453/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Oﬃce, Durham University, University Oﬃce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
2
·Misc... D t.r 
c. 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE BRITISH.IRON 
AND STEEL INDUSTRY, THROUGH DEPRESSION 
AND RECOVERY, 1919-1939, WITH PARTICULAR 
. . 
REFERENCE. TO ~HE. PROBLEM OF LOCATION. 
D. I. KING, 
3rd Year Honours in Politics & 
Economics, 
University Coll.ege, Durham. 
----------------------------------
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
--- ---·- ·---
- . ·------------~ 
• 
I N T R 0 D U C T' I 0 N~ 
The two decades falling between two major world wars 
are of special interest in the history of the iron· and steel 
(and other) industries for this period covers, the· evolution 
from competitive private enterprise to an acceptance of 
some measure of coercian and control by the state. The 
issue between thos'e who favour private ownership and those 
who favour complete strete control is still being contested, 
. 
" however. from one side, we are told that as matters stand in 
Great Britain today, it' is indispensable to raise the steel 
indus~ry to the highest possible level of efficiency •••• 
because Great Britain needs: extensive capital ~a-equipment 
which depends. on steel, and must raise· exports: to the. highest 
possible level in order to procure the means· of life. 
The raising of e~or~s also depends on steel • • • • Therefore 
in ·the interests. both of the export trade and of.· speeding up 
the re-equipmen:t of British induatries·, the nationalis·ation 
, 
of steel is, an immediate and urgent necessity(l). But an 
authori tat1 ve voice from wi th,in the industry de.clares the 
..... 
St~el Bill " is·. a thoroughly bad bill for it interferes with 
a well organised industry which is: securing record outputs 
and is in the midst of' a great development plan. It cannot 
add to the eff'icie~cy of the industry, lead to cheaper s.teel, 
or more cordial relat·ions between managements and employees. 
I do not exaggerate when I say that nationalisation of steel 
would be a disaster for the com1try. Not only steel but 
virtua'lly the whole of British .industry would be involved11 • ~) 
This: complex stl'uggle lies beyond the~ present scope, but· a 
preview of it is: given to show that all the hard lessons and 
bitter experiences of the inter-war years·. have far from 
resolved themselves into unanimity of opinion. Probably there · . 
(1) G.D.H.Cole. ''Why Nationalise steel?'' p.46. 
(2) Sir Ellis: Hunter, Chairman, DormGn Long & Co. Company 
Mee-ting Dec.l6th, 1948. 
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would be universal agreement now that t.o say "the pres:ent 
distribution of the industries of this country approximat.es~ 
very closely to the distribution which enables each of' those 
industries to operate most economically and efficiently" (l) 
would be to make a glaring overstatement. Beyond that it would 
be unwise to_go, without bringing in the bias which the student 
of' the -location of' the iron and. steel :i,ndustry must almost in- ' 
evitably acquire. The problera o~·- location is of course only 
one corner of the vast field wit~ which the current contro-
versies about nationalisa-tion are concerned;· but it is· intimately 
connected with many of the other problems;, and all views 
acquiesce to itS'· importance. Whether in the light of this 
intimate connection with other factors, it would be efficacious 
to abstract and select it as a special object; for centralised 
control,. is a question, the answer to which may appear to 
,. 
emerge in the ensuing pages. But even if nationalisation is 
not carried through u the problem of what to do about ste~l 
.. 
Will! .. remain If • ( 2 ) 
OUTLINE OF THIS SURVEY. 
It is proposed, first to give details; of the general 
t~ends; of' production and the difficulties connected with 
international trade during the inter-w:sr years,, the former to 
indicate . the s:oope of' the industry' S' activities· at varying 
levels:- of' demand; the .international sequence of events to show 
hov1 the British industry declined in the world markets:. 'rhis·. 
is followed by a brief' description of the geographical layout 
. . 
of the industry in .this country at the close of the period. 
This' analysis is intended to place the iron and 'steel industry 
in perspective, and to provide a background to the more de-
tailed examination which follows, and which concerns i tsel:f' . 
principally with the problems; of location • No attempt will 
(1) Board of Trade.Evidence before Royal cOimniss-ion on 
distribution of· the Indus,trial Population. 
(2) Economist - Nov.6th, 1948. 
.. 
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be made t·o give an exhaustive area-by-area survey of present 
and desirab'le future locations• The f!Pproa:ch. is bas·ed mainly 
on the developments: which actually took place between 1919 and 
1939, with an exmaination of the locational factors involved 
in each instance. 
• • • • • • 
BRITISH IRON AND STEEL PRODUCTION AND 
-oo:----~-~-----.. --. ..--.... 
l!f.t~~ATIONAJ.. TRADE._l919 - 1939. 
Although the capacity of th~ iron and steel industry 
can only be increased at a slow rate, the demand for steel 
tends• to fluctuate·violently because th~ industry is engaged 
primarily upon supplying the·capita~ construction indu&.tries, 
such as Building, conatructiona~ engineering and Ship-
building. In a .Period of depression it does not appear 
·profitable to lay out capital in new fact.ories•, machinery or 
ships. Hence w'ithin a year or tw.o, demand can halve or 
double it~elf, as Table 2 shows. In fact, as: one wri.ter· has 
aptly put it: '~s;teel is the boom-and-~lump-industry p~ 
ex.cellence". ( 1) From the estimate ( 2) of the di~ect co~-
. . . 
sumption of. steel by the main industrial groups in this country 
in 1937, it will be seen (Table 1) that one fifth goes into 
building and constructional engineering and more than a 
quarter into making machines, ships· and motor cars. 
TABLE. 1. 
Building & Const~ Engineering 
Mechanical Engineering 
Ship-building & Ma~ine Engineering 
i 
· Railways & Rolling Stock 
Haf"dware', Hollow w~re 
Thousand Toru!.!. 
1725 
1180 
840 
760 
790 
Rivets, nuts,.boits, screws, chains> etc. 630 
Motor ·and cycle .55,0 
Wire ~ wire manUfactures 500 
Collieries 360· 
.. Electrical Engineering. 235· 
Per C!fu 
22 
14 
10 
9 
9.5 
7.5 
6.5 
6 
4.5 
?·. 
8 Others~ ___ _.7._1.._.0_. ----------
* Etquivalent to 11,040 ingot tons. iie.!. .· 8.,·280~ 100 
ne amount·emerE1ng from tne.stee ~urnaces •. (l)Econ·omist JifeW.6th 1948· ·(2) ~.~.M.Shone, EcQnom~c D;irector. of' Iron & 
· · tuee+ F~der1at1o~ 1n paper to Royal .. · . · at1st1ca Soc1et 22. • 
It •. 
' 
..... 
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With such a high proportion of the steel output being consumed 
; ,I 
by ilidus,tries which are particularly responsive to general 
business condi tiona, it·· is clear why· -~he indus;try· ( l) ''ref'leets 
with considerable accuracy the alternations of' periods of' 
economic prosperity and depression". 
TABLEk. 
IRON~- STE~~_ODUCTION IN,r U.K. 
STEEL. 
(Million tons1) 
1919 7-4 7.9 
192.0 8.o 9.1 
19'21 2.6 3.7 
1922 4.9 5.9 
1923 
.7-·4 8.5 
1924 7.3 8.2 
1925 6.3 7.4 
1926 2.5 }.6 
1927 7.3 9.1 
1928 6.6 8.5 
192.9 7.6 . 9~6 
1930 6.2 1·3· 
l93il 3i.8 5.2 
193:2 3 .• 6 5.3 
l933i 4.1 7.0 
1934 6.0 8.8 
1935 6.4 9 •. 8 
1936 7-7 11.8 
1937 8.5 13.0 
1938 6;8 10.4 
1939 8.0 13.2 
The production of!. ·rig-iron in the period bears an obvious 
~elation to the output of steel, although there has been a growing 
divergence principally a~ccoun~ed tor by the _increasing use of 
(l·) "Britain in Depression•~. Iron & Steel Industry. 
E.J>. McCallum, M.A.,. 
_: .. --.. ·; .. : .;, . ·_,_ .. ~.:~- .. -- ... . :, -~r_., .. <"~:-;. 
- . 
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scrap in the steel making process. 1920, 1929 and 1936-7 
atand out-as; boom years for the iron and steel industry. In 
192'0, the post-war boom was at its' height, but recession was 
swift and dra:stic as is sho\m by the figures for 1921. The 
" 
three months; coal strike or that year accentuated the decline 
in production. Output rose; in 192'J a·nd 1924 under the s.timulant 
or temporary disa.ocation or continenta-l- compe_ti tion due to the 
. ' . 
occupation of the Ruhr. This was not maintained in 1925, 
p~rtly because ~r~ce and ~elgium w.~re again competing strongly 
in export markets; and als:o the f'ranc had been d~preciated. The 
General Strike of 1926 explains the severe reduction o~ output 
of-iron and steel: demand improved after this unt~l it reached 
·its;' peak in 1929 ~ The figures; for pig-iron {7.'6 millioru tons.) 
. . 
represent the highest output s~ince 1920, whilst the steell. pro-
duction of 9.6 million tons was matched·only by the_output for 
. 
1917 {9. 7 mill.ion tonS>). After rallying somew~at in early 1930, 
the rate of production of both iron and s,tee:l fell away in the 
path of' the 11Great- Depression''• 
• r •• 
·:;rt w.as not until ·the spring 
of 1933 that the ind:ustry began to revive, by which time' the 1932 
Tariff was beginning to have significant effect·. This revival in 
production continued steadily until, by 1935, tlie steel output -
9. 8 mill:i,.on tons:.·- had just passed the 1929 figure. 1936 saw 
the beginning of-the re-armament programme and this coupled with 
the return of normal business conditions led to a boom iru 1937, 
when thirteen mil]ion tons of steel were produce·d. This .record-
breaking figure was exceeded only. slightly -in th:e year 193i9 ~ 
·which marks the close of' the two decades under review. With 
the advent of the 1939-45 war, the fears; of many leaders. in the 
industry that the increases in steel making capa_ci ty during the 
re-armament period might have proved financially embarassing, 
were abated, and indeed, the current problem is pri~cipally 9f 
under-capacity in th~ race or an unprecedentedly high demand. 
During the pre-tariff and pre-depression years after 1918, 
British steelmakers claimed that the war had helped their 
continental rivals in f'our main respects·. These favourable 
-·6 
ci~cUJ.ns:tances to the continental prod~cers, which D.L.Burn 
dis·cu~s~s in some detail, (l~ w.ere: 
(1) Currency-deflation in the· U.K. and a return to the Gold 
Standard in 1925 as against the prolong~d inflation w.hich 
obtained in most continental countries. 
(2) The extensive re-equipment made necessary by war-time 
., . 
. . 
losses- and .·devastation, which was often financed by the State 
and wh~c~ helped to sharpen continentsl rivalry in those .Years. 
(3) A permanent increase in the economic activity of' the Con-
tinental governments, as e. g. through consular services: and 
preferential railway rates: for exports. 
(4) Other influences arising out of the war which tended to 
W·id'en the gap between the price· of European and British labour, 
. . 
e.g: The stricter observance·of the eight hour day in Britain 
than on the .continent. The claim is ·not made that the con-
tinental producers: were devoid of' problems; but conditions gave 
them a stimruaus which seems to have been lacking in the British 
industry, with its heavy burdens of debts and reticence towards 
dynamic change. As can be seen f'~om Table 3, the annuS~l imports: 
· of iron and steel between 1919 and 1927 fluctuated widely, but 
there was·a persistent tendency towards an increase of imports, 
which at its climax in 1927 reflected the coal strike of the 
preceding year. ~he i·nf'lux came principally from ~ranee. 
Belgtum .and Ge~many, and after the abnormal early post-war years, 
steel 11 s:emis" - mass produced bille,ts~ and 'bars - .were the most 
succe.ssf'ul products to compete with Bri tis'h goods in the home 
market, accounting for half the total of' imports~ 
~1) D. L. ~urn '.~~conomic History of steel making" 
pages 403; - 426. 
j 
,/ 
, .. ·· ~ 
... 
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TAB~ J. 
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF IRON AND STEEL • 
. - ~ ,. 
YEAR IMPORTS EXPORTs· 
1.9~9~~2~~ ~~~lllon- tons) (~111i6n"'tons:) 
1919 .5 2.2 
1920 1.1 3:.3 
~921 1.6 1.7 
1922:. .9 3.4 
-· '1923 1.,3) 4-3 
24" ;• .. 2.,4 3.9 
25 2.7 3-7 
26. 3 •. 7 3:.0 
27 4.4 4.2 
28 2.9.1 4-> 
29 2.8 4.4 
'30 2.9 }.2 
31 2.81 2.0 
32 1.6. 1.9. 
3)3 1.0 1.9 
34 1.4 ·2.3 
35 1.2 2.4 
,3;6 1.5, '2.2>' 
37 2 •. 0 2 •. 6 
38 1.3i .2.0 
39 1 •. 8. 1.6, 
There was no s:udden .. diminution of. imports; with the 
onset of the d~pression, 'the volUme remaining fairly 
con_st~t b~tween 1929 and 1931. ~ith the imposition of 
a protec;tive: duty in ~pril 1932 of 33~%, how·ever, there 
was·a great reduction of imports. Home production .o~ iron 
and steel was· s-timulated as a result of partial economic 
recovery behind the tariff in 1933. In the same year, 
imports fell to the low l~vel of one million tons., and 
remained- at a snaller volume than before: for the rest of· 
- 8 -
the period under review. As ~he ~mport Duties Advisory 
Connni ttee has pointed_ out: ( 1) tlie average annual imports; 
for 1933-3~ were lees than hal~ the average volume of_ 
imports in the four years preceding' the tariff. Never.the..;. 
lese there is reason to suppose tha-t the British s.teelmakers 
resented the increase of imports. above even the 1933 level, 
and a complexity of tariff, quota and licence regulations 
waa developed to cope with the situation. 
There is evidence of undue= optimism in an article emanating 
frorri the "Economist" in i921.( 2 ) It was written that "the iron 
and steel industry had escaped from the_hot-house atmosphere 
o~ war conditions to the colder but more invigorating breezes 
of free competition'~· The British export figures; during the= 
inter-war years seem to indicate rather that the breeze·s were 
enervating in effect • ~-. D. McCallum formulated the 'opinion (3~ 
tha·t the loss of British export trade could be attributed 
directly to the war having stimulated production in· other 
countries and to the loss of contact between tpe:British industry 
and pre-war oversea customers. On the other hand, D.L. Burn 
affirms ~hat (4)u the degree of change which had occurred in 
the industry \vas quite inadequa-te.: to restore the competitive 
strength of common-grade steel-making in Great Britain", although 
it must be added·that Great Britain could hold.her own in the 
tin plate and galvanieed sheet trade, although increasingly 
challenged. By 1925, the total world trade in iron and steel 
had s~pass·ed the ~re-\v.ar figure; but where·as the continental 
exporters had gone beyond their pre-war maximum, the U.K. was 
still behind e~cept in the export pf rolled products. When 
the depression came, the British industry lost far more than 
its; continental rivals~ With the advent of the tariff, the 
(1) Cmd~ 5507, 1937. The Import Duties" Advisory Committee is 
referred to hereafter-by its initials - I.D.A.C. 
(2) "Economist" ~eb.l9th 1921. (3) Qp.cit. p.265. 
(4) 9P•Cit. P•393e 
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entire external trade in iron.and steel became regulated by 
agreement with the Continental Steel Cartefand a. s~ries 
of subsidiary agreements with such non-cartel countries 
as Denmark, Norway and Sw.eden, and also with various inter-
. . 
national cartels in the tin-plate, rail and tube making 
sections of the industry. (l) The; average annual decline in 
expo_rts between 1927-31 and 1933-37 amounted to 1. 3 million 
tons~ It is interesting to note that the distribution of 
British iron and steel exports as'between British and foreign 
overseas countries v~ied only_slightly up to the Depression 
in the 30's •. British countries took 50.9% of the British. 
export in 1924 and 50.2% in 1?29. The~ proportion of th~ 
export trade held.by the U.K. in the privileged Empire 
markets continued to be fairly constant in the following 
decade·, but was increasingly threatened as the making of 
iron and steel became more and more disper·sed. · Canada, 
India, ~ustralia and ~outh Africa advanced their output 
slowly; whilst New Zealand, Eire, Turkey, Greece and Brazil 
' 
were cormnencing home producti-on at the end of the period. The 
·• inter-war years, then, display a picture of steadily declining 
exports both absolutely and comparatively.with those of the 
' 
·other large steel exporting nations of the world. 
GEOGRAPHICAL LAYOUT OF 
THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY: 1938. 
The North East Coast, which is still the main producing 
di~trict, W$S originally especially favoure~. It had ample 
good, cheap Durham co~ng coal, a good supply of Cleveland 
ore and nearness to the coast giving facilities for export. 
By li9J8, however, the ~rea was importing nearly half the to·tal 
ore requirements: from over.seas. coking coal had also become 
scarcer and rather dearer than in earlier years. The capacity 
of the area is about three million ingot tons of steel per year, 
(1) Cmd. 5507 1937. 
io-
and the outp~t is predominantly structural steel - shipbuilding 
materials, plates, sheets and rails. 
Dorman Long, South Durham steel·and Iron and Consett Iron 
are the principal firms in the area. 
Closely following the Ncrth.East Coast in ingot capacity 
is the South Wsles area. There is an adequate coal supply 
locally, but the ore has to be imported -·from the Midlands 
and overseas. Pig iron is drawn from Lincolnshire. Ebbw Vale 
~ 
is the only important inland centre of' production in South 
Wales, the other main works being on the coast at Cardiff', 
Margam, Port Talbot and Newport. Sheet steel and tinplate are 
the principal products of the .industry in South Wales;, of which 
Ebbw Vale accounts for about 30% of the area's tinplate output. 
Richard Thomas & Baldwins and Guest Keen Baldwins are the largest 
' . 
firms, the latter producing heavy steel, plates, rails, bil1ets 
and sections. 
The coastal iron and steel area. in West Scotland has an 
annual output of' about two million ingot ton~. As in the North 
East region, early advantages have now disapp~are~: the hard 
splint coal of Lanarkahire,·capable of b~ing used uneDked in 
blast furnaces and the local ore supplies have been largely 
exhausted. In·l938 all the ore had to be imported from England 
and.overseas; quantities of' ·coke and pig iron were also drawn from 
other districts. There is an excellent local market· in the.Clyde 
shipbuilding and heavy engineering works, and. the shipyards are 
also· a good source of' Brap which is used by the Scottish steel 
· industry in a very high proportion. The main products are heavy 
plates, sections and f9rgings. Colvilles Ltd. and its subsidiaries 
dominate the Scottish indus;tr~ .... 
. . 
In the Cumberland and North Lancashire area, are found the 
only British deposits of' he~ite ore, now almost exhausted. The 
. ingot s.teel capacity of the area in 1938 \"'as about 3,50,000 tons,· . 
. but in the same year ore imports; of' 603,300 tons were almost as 
large as the local hematite output. About half' of the pig iron 
., 
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production is turned into first quality 'acid' s.teel locally 
and· the remainder of the'pig iron is sent to places; like 
Sheffield to be manufactured into special steels. "<l'ood 
caVing coal is found in the area, but nevertheless coal comes 
in from the North East coast despite heavy transport c_ha:rges·. 
Extensive loading· and unloading facilities hav~ been provided 
at Workington by the Unitec;l' Steel Company, which is the largest 
producer. The Mallom & Askam Haematite Iron Co. and the 
Barrow Hematite Steel Co. are the other two finas operating in 
the area. 
Further from the coast than any other steel produc~ng area 
of·comparable magnitude is Shef'fie~d, with a capacity of just 
over two million tons. Coal, but no ore is f'o~d.locally, 
and little iron making goes.~n there. Pig Iron is supplied 
from Lincolnshire and Northamptonshire, and in· the case of' 
elec$ric are furnaces~· there is a good local supply ef' scrap -
the only charge required for these furnaces. A wide range of' 
specialised-steel products; characterises the bulk of' the 
Sheffield output;: and United ·steel, The English Steel Corporation 
and Thomas Firth. and John Bra\~ Ltd. are the principa~ firms. 
Lancashire, Cheshire and North Wales: produced about one 
million tons between them in 1938. The ore was, imported from 
Lincolnshire and Northamptonshire and some pig iron was drawn 
from Stoke by John Summers Ltd. of' Shotton, Cheshire. The 
latter firm, ~ one of' the largest in the area, specialises in 
steel sheets, whilst the subsidiaries of the. Lancashire Stee.l 
Corpora1tion at· Irlam produce wire rods; •. The finished products 
find a good market ·locally in induatriaa L~cashire, but the 
export trade was becoming more important at the end of the 
period. 
The two remaining areas of' iron production in Great 
Britain are also the newest. By 1938, Lincdlnshire had a 
capacity o~ apout one and a half million tons and Northampton-
shire half a million tons. Both these areas are based on 
- 12 -
plentiful ore supplies, but coal has to be ~rought in from South 
Yo.rkshire. Pig iron is sent to Sheffield amd Scotland~ 'Semi' 
prGducts: to Sheffield BjD.d South W.ales from Licolnshire~ whilst 
at qorby in Northamptonshire, s~~rts and Lloyds. are the centre 
of a great tube manufacturing works. The distinctive feature 
of both areaa; is their adoption of large in~egrated plants. 
United Steel (Ap:g·leb~ Frodiingham) John ~ysaaght Ltd. (Scunthorpe) 
and Thomas Firth and John Bro'llm Ltd. (Scunthorpe) m-e the leading 
firms in Lincolnshire. 
A glance at a map will reveal that, ignoring. the comparatively 
small producing.areas of North West England, the bulk Gf the 
iron and steel industry in Great Britain is centred in a broad 
belt stretching from Llanelly and Cardiff in the South, through 
..... S:tleffield and Corby, Consett • Skinningrove, to Glasgo\"1 and Coat,;_ 
bridge in the North. This \vide arc embraces the l:ackbone of 
industrial Britlh and is of first rate importance to the National 
economy. In 1919 it included a large nwnber of small inefficient 
plant~, operating with obsolescent equipment and using out of date 
methods of production •. The twenty years of the industr~s 
history wh_ich we a:re about to study exhibit what can perhaps. be 
described in retrospect as the first tentative steps to regain1. 
the proud position which the British Iron and steel industry held 
in the world for its techniques and skills several decades before 
World War I. 
THE BRITISH IRON·~~ STEEL INDUSTRY AND ITS 
. . ---
LOC~TION~· P~OBLE~~Jb919-1939. 
'!Economic theory reflects the very recent growth ot interest 
in problems of' industrial location, for .there is little reference 
~o the matter in classical .economics, whilst such treatment which 
developed later is not of' a character which can give much assist-
ance in analysing the recent-trends of change" (l) The conclusion 
(l) s:.R .. Dennison. 11 The Location of Industry & the depre·ss:ed areas'~ p.2. 
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reached by Professor Denn•ison seems; to be shared b.y Professor 
a'.H.Jones;, when he wro·te several years earlier th:at (l) ·~it is, 
perhaps, idle to. search for a theory of' location, which may be 
used ·to explain· the present distribution of' indus.try and the 
indu&trial population. The 'analysis must. be descriptive.'~ 
These theories which have been develope~ fall roughly into two 
categories: the inductive or his.torical and the deductive. 
Both types. of' theory have aimed to be of' general application, 
but neither have succeeded. The most that can be said is that 
the more carefully constructed. theories permit of' generalisations 
' about the special significance of' particular factors. If it 
wer·e the intention here to provide a theoretic.al 11 justification" 
for the location of the British Iron & Steel industry, the 
. . 
Weberian analysis could be followed with a fair degree of in-
tegrity to explain certad.n aspects of' the position of the indus.try 
du~ing the 19th century; but it would have to be abandoned for 
an adequate treatment of the two decades 1919-1939 to be possible. 
The fact is that we are necessarily dealing with the existence of 
large quantitie~ of durable capital situated in certain places, 
so that it would strain credulity to attempt to reduce all the 
elements which we .shall have to -discuss to mere technical co-
eff'icients; operating in an industrial void. The method adopted 
will be des·criptive, j:;h~n, anq no claim Ali universality is made: 
for the locational. factors which are considered to have been 
dominant in.the geographical distribution of the iron and.steel 
industry in Great Britain. A further point to be noted, of 
especial importance when dealing with a: 11 basic 11 industry, is 
that locational change is a gradual process. In t~e comparatively 
short period of'. 20 years,, dynamic m d far reaching changes are 
hardly to be expected. The past weighs heavily upon the present,· 
and a balanced picture of loeational trends in the indus~try 
.cannot be depicted •. therefore by the extraction of' what occurred 
betvreen the two World wars alone.1his latter period Will be 
discuss.ed in some detail as to the re-organisation and shifts in 
(1) Professor a'.H.Jones• A memorandum on the Location of' Indus:try. 
Appendix II. Barlow. Report. 
location which took place in an att:ernpt to .discover the con-
temporary influences. at work determdn.Sing location, together 
with some idea of their relative importance; but the first task 
must be to look back into the 19th century. 
'~It may be broadly stated that throughout the 19th century 
., 
coal acted as: the great magnet to the industrial population other 
than that which was concentrated in the chief shipping and 
commercial~ areas'• ·~ ( 1 ) Coal was used in the manufacture of 
coke, which,. in turn, was mixed with ore and limestone in the 
· blast furnace. The country was·. fortunate in poss.essing ample 
quantities of good quality ores on most of the principa~·coal-
fields. Thus the pig iron indus;try was attracted to these 
districts which o:f:fered the lowest combined transport c·osts per 
ton of.pig iron. If the ore had a high iron content and a com-
paratively large amount of coal was required to produce a ton of 
iron, the indus.try was naturally located near the coal; and vice 
versa• ·~ 
. . 
The desire to keep down the costs of transport similarly 
attracted steel production close to pig iron supplies where, more-
over, the necessary coa·l for the gas-producer plants would be 
re~dily available. As the 19th century drew ·to a close, however, 
loe·al ores; near ·the coalfields were becoming exhaus.ted, and iron-
ore was imported from abroad to cope with the demands of the ex-
panding steel· indus;try. Econom~es in coal consumption of quite 
a considerable degree were also important in weakening the hold 
of the coalfields• Transport costs were now to be reduced by 
erecting blast furnac~s ne·ar to the ·coast, often in close proximity 
to the· coalfields:, for dealing with the imported ore.s. In other 
places, notably South Wales and South West scotland, the steel 
indus.try ca:eveloped upon imported pig iron, the ores being smelted 
abroad. The importance of transport costs is again shown by the 
process of specialisation w.i thin the· steel industry. In South 
Wales for example, stee1 bars are produced for tinplate manu-
facture, and a large proportion o~ the tinplate was formerly ex-
ported; the North East coast specialised upon steel for ship. and 
(1) Royal Commission on the distribution of the industrial p_opulation. 
p.30. 
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boiler plates and girders and other materials required -in 
engineering and shipbuilding. This tendencw has the ef~ect 
of reducing the cost of distributing and marketing the products 
of the area:;., and 1 ts appearance cannot· be regarded as acc . fdentaJI.. 
It will thus be seen that the cost of transport has played an 
out standing part in determining the location of the iron and s:teel 
industry: part of this cost can be ~ttributed to that of trans-
porting the coal to the ore and the ore to the coal, and part of 
it to the distribution of the product, the latter influencing the 
type of product produced in a. particular district. This con~ 
clus,ion is deducible from the remarks of the Royal. Co~ssion;(l),~ 
1p. the location of the iron and steel indu,stri.es na,tural con-
ditions played a decisive part. Nevertheless, that the markets 
also exercised an i~ortant influence· is shown by the line of 
specialisation followed by the iron and steel industry in different 
parts of the country.·~ Such an explanatioru- and it is commonly 
expressed - cannot be regarded.., as cpmplete, ,however, until it is 
related to the transport factor. 
When the 1914-18 war was oyer, the geographical dis;tribution 
of the British Iron and Steel industry remained very much as it 
had been l:e fore. The iron and steel department• of the Ministry 
of Muni tiona liad been created to ensure an adequate supply of 
steel for war needs, anq its policy was that of increasing pro-
duction with a minimum of new capital equipment, by extensions 
and re-conditioning of old equipment. Indeed, Sir·John Hunter, 
the head of the Department from 1916 commented that 11 no steel-
s 
makers. expressed confidence in the utilisation of the extenions-
" 
as comme.rc ial proposi tiona after the war 11 • ( 2 ) This may have 
been because the steelmakers did not know where the demand would 
be corning from to utilise the capacity which, as will be seen from 
'Pable 4 was greatly increased. 
(1) op.ci~. paragraph 71. 
( 2:) :i:ron and Coal Trades Review. September 23rd, 1921. 
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TABLE 4. 
EXTENSIONS ARRANGED FOR 1916-1918.~1) 
New; Blast Furnaces .•. 
Scotland 
N.E. Coast 5 
Lines. 4 
Midlands 5 
South Wa•les: 4 
Curnberland & Lancs.4 
Ne\V s·.teel Furnaces. 
Basic Acid.· 
JJ. 
21 
8 
38 
14 
17 
8 
3 
10 
5 
10 
'~It is natural ~o suppose th8.1t the great expansions of 
steel-r;Iaking in Sheffield (the '~Midlands" refers principally 
to the Sheffield: air'ea.). and ::j.n Scotland· were a response to the 
peculiair'lY acute demand for the kinds of' steel which these 
dis,tricts made w:ell'~ writes D.L •. Burn~ ( 2 ~ But he goes on to 
point out that makers;" of' steel in other dis~tricts: had. been 
( 0Mf8t<.flt 
proved just ·as oonrideat as Sheffield to produce shell steel. 
The building programme in_cluded two important projects. for the 
' Cl ' Sheffield area which must inevitably give new life to mass-
production steel making in Sheffield·~ (3) &.new. plant at 
Peni&tone by Cmmnell Lairds;, and a larger one at Rotherham by 
! 
Steel Peeeh & T.ozer; Shef'f'i.eld had bfi3come established as a 
centre of' high grade steel manufacture, turning out products· 
' 
such as cutlery, forgings and armame~ts where the costs of' 
~ 
transport of' the final product were not~major consideration. 
Its location was s:Uited to this sort·of' work as the leading 
Sheffield. makers realised but hardly so ~or the mass productiorn 
of' steel, which i~volve~ the transportation of' pig iron f'rom 
other parts of' the country to make a; product which could have. 
been produced mt lower cost. at, aay, Lincolnshire or Northampton-
shire where much of' the pig iron came from. Moreo.ver, "the 
(1) ·F.H.Hatch. The Iron & Steel industry of the U.K. under war 
conditions (1919). 
(2) Burn op.cit. p.359. 
(3.,) _Ibid·~ 
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' 
leadership in a special indu&try, which a dis;trict derives 
from an ind~strial atmosphere, sue~ as that of' Shef:+ield1 ~ j( l) . 
could not be invoked as; legitimate reason for introducing the 
manufacture of a product for \Vhich an adequate supply of sui·tably · 
trained personnel existed in districts otherwise more favoured 
for non-specialised heavy steel output. 
T~e wa~time development& in the Sheffield area open up an 
interesting topic: we hav.e alr~ady s:een that transport ·costs, 
exercised a great in:t'l~ence during -the 19th century upon the; 
location of-the industry, but there are figures to shoWi that 
this factor has been of somewhat diminishing importance during 
th~ 12 riod under review:, although the mere fact that coa:l, ore 
and marke~s·: a,re not all found· in the same· pla;ce, makes it in-
evitable that transport should continue to.be· a significant 
factor in the costs of iron and steel. The· cost of transporting 
pig iron and scrap for steel making is a much less relatively 
important item than that of transporting the materials to mak~ 
pig iron. The Committee on indu~try and trade (2 ) quoted three 
firms in the Cleveland district producing p:ig irons in 192.5, the 
average costs of' transporting the.raw materials was about one 
fifth of the market price of the product,~ the number of ton-miles 
involved being approximately 120 in al]. three. cases·. These· 
figures a~e confirmed by the I.D.A.C's· report on the ·iron and 
steel industry,(3) when the average co&ts for the whole of the 
pig iron section of' the· indus~ry w.ere ascertained. For the 
same three Cleveland firms, however, the cost of' transporting 
pig iron to the steel works was found to be ·jus,t over 4% of' its 
price, while an approxima¢e calculation from I.D.A.C's report· 
shows an average figure of' a little·over 5% of' the market price 
in 193'6, as the cost of' transporting the materials.for steel 
making.1fhese figures exclude integrated plants of' course. The 
method of charging by the railways has also weakened slightly 
the loca:tional importance of' transport cost's·. 
( l) Marshal·l 11 Industry & Trade11 
(2) 11l?actors in Indus:trial & Connnercial Efficiency•~. 
(.3.) Cmd. 5507, 193i7. 
Coal, iron ore, 
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pig iron, raw steel and iron and steel sc~ap - ~11 bulky items 
in relation to value, are placed in a low class~ in the railway 
classification of traffic arid charged a relatively low ton-mile 
rate. ··In 1935 the iron and steel indus;tries covered 17.4% of 
the volume: of rail traffic but paid only 14.6% of ~he railway 
companies receipts: from goods: traffic. The greater the distance 
travelled moreover, the lower the rate per ton-mile charged. 
That this ·last factor is "not generally an element of 
great import~ce 11 , (1) is borne out by the comparatively high 
. . 
railway rates charged in·Brit~as against other countries. In 
1927-8, the transport costs per ton-mile averaged, for heavy 
finished iron and steel - UB;A .45d, Britain .94d, German~ .85d, 
- (2 and for 'semi' products- U.s· .• A •• 43d, Britain .78d, Germany .56d 
This, however, is> germane to tne present topic only in so far as 
the high level of British rates by tending to put up the price of 
British steel at home and abroad placed an additional burden· om 
the industry and thus hampered the necessary tasks of reorganisation 
At the end of the first world war it was said that those f..our 
years: of intensive activity in the iron and steel indus•try had 
led to the establi_shment of (3) 11nev1 works; •• •·• fed by home ores., 
and self-contained,. providing on the same site modern coke ovens 
equipped with: by-product recovery plants, blast furnaces:, steel 
. . 
works and rolling mills." In actuau fact, excluding the Sheffield 
developments, there was only one wholly new combined works erected-. 
This WiSs at Redcar, and Dorman Longs!:· _used it ~or heavy. plate 
making: its proximity to shipping facilities must be· counted as 
an important factor in favour of' this lo~ation, as the North _East 
coast has come to rely increasingly upon imported ores• A 
similar remark could be applied to Baldwins.' Port Talbot Steel 
. . 
Works which was transformed into a combined works by the addition 
of blast furnaces ·and coke ovens; during the war years. The Port 
Talbot project pro~ides at least one example of'. a refutation of 
:1) Op.ci~. Dennison p.so. 
2) Burnham & HGskins "Iron & Steel in Britain 1870-1930. 
3) Hatch op.cit. p.42. 
,. 
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Sir John Hunter's: earlier quo~ted remark, in that th~ combined 
works; was obvious'ly intended to make pig iron' from imported ores, 
being situated at the docks where mechanical unlo~ding gear was 
available •. There is just one other case: to note.:: at Se;unthorpe, 
where a steelworks> was added to a blast furnaee1 plant operating 
without. coke-ovens:; but elsewhere in the words bf D.L.Burn 11 where 
disintegration .was normal it remained •••• subs>tantially this 
exemplified the Ministry~s-policy; there was no effort to con-
centrate :P~oduction ...... (1) 
The previous paragraph gives: an intimation of what has been 
a material technical change in the iron and steel industry during 
• the present century; a change which has ·exercised a-profound 
influence on recent geographic trends~ Blast furnace~ and s~eel 
producing ·plants have been erected as a single establishment and 
pig~iron conveyed in mol ten form to the ~teel furnaces.. The 
effect of this> integration has been.to conse»ve heat in the 
steel-making process and to reduce the amount of coal required to 
produce a ton of steel. '~Much of' the e:teel industry grew·_ up at 
a time when the need for such practices was not realised, or ·the: 
opportunity of them did not exist; and the result is S'~ill seen 
'in the faulty location or in the divorce. of proeesses which can 
best be: carri~d ~n together in the same establi.shnient'' ( 2 ) 
-~ As result of the integrstion of proc~esses: it has become 
n 
profitable to develop+ ihe ore-fields of Lincolnshire and 
Northarnptonshire, using the local ores- of low iron conten~, which 
are plentiful a~though 'lean'. No coal is.; found in these areas,. 
and it theref.ore has to be transported from· elsewhere - notably 
.• 
from the South Yorkshire coalfields. Lines. and Northants. are 
usua~ly singled out as: being outstanding examples of the locational 
shift made possible by -these economies of· technical integration, 
but it should not ··be overlooked that in• other parts of the country 
as well there~.has; been a marked moy.ement: .. towards the location of 
coke ovens beside the st·eel works, the additional costs of 
transporting coal .instead of coke b_~ing outw.eighed by the ec·onomies 
(1) Op.cit. p.36~. 
(2) G •. D •. H •. Cole. "Why liattonalise Steel?u 
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of integration even, though the transport cost of sending coke 
from.pithea:d to furnace is 30% lowell' than that of.sendi"ng the 
. . . 
coal . neces~·ary to produce; ai similar amount of ·coke-. .. This latter 
movement had not gained much ground at the beginning of· the inter-
war period, however: most of the new war time coke~ovens were 
erected,· as in earlier days,close to the coal-mines and entirely 
. . 
divorced from the subsequent stages· of blast furnace and steel·· 
works~, and t}).e s-urplus gases which could have yielded great fUel 
economies in the transfer process from blast fUrnace to coke-ovens, 
and from coke-ovens to stee+w:orks were consequently wasted. 
In 1918, a Departmental Committee of_the Board of Trade: 
appointed ·~ to cons:ider the position of the, iron and steel trades 
after the war" issued its official ·Report, which endorsed·, amongs-t 
other thi~gs, a policy of re-organisation within the indus-try to 
concentrate production in large efficient plants each capable of 
producing 300,000 tons of steei a year or more.- "•.. it ·was 
possible: at one time:, to produce steel s-trip economically at the 
rate of 10,000 ton~ per annum" state the writers of a P~E".P. 
Report (~) 11 but with modern plant the economic minimwn is nearer 
250.,000 tons~ per a:nn:um; 11 and they conclude therefore tp.at ,·1 such 
changes obviously have a profound et"f'ect on location'~ b·y super-
seding smaller units.· But ·oppositi~n from within the industry 
- {1:~5 
·three decades; ago was sufficient, and competition between 
was imperfect enough to over-ride the.reconmendations of the 
Commdttee: such combinations among firms. which did arise did not 
lead to the construction of· new plants: on modern lines., and the 
prevailing tendency was towards vertical integration, although not 
unfortunately with an eye on the tectnical advantages; which ~ight 
have been gained_thereby •. To illustrate this point: firms 
located on the North East coast1 in Lancashire and South Wales 
bought up mines and quarries, in the East Midlands towards the e~d 
of the war in order to safeguard themselves against a shortage of 
iron ore. · More migh~ have been expected of the newly formed 
United Steel Company a horizontal amalgamation consisting at 
(1) Report on the Location of· Indus,try, 1937.P.54· 
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first of the two Sheffield firms, Samuel Fox & Coy. ·and Steel 
Peech & Tozer, and later absorbing the Workington Iron and Steel 
Coy. in Cumberland and the Frodingham Iron & Steel Coy. in 
Lincolnshire, but as Burn points out (l) 11 itdid nothing 
commensurate with its size to reduce 'the: subdivision of pro-
ducti0n11, and the; ambitious plans'. of the Departmental Committee. 
may be said to have fallen on stony ground, a;t any event tempo-
rsrily, until the keen winds of' foreign competition and economi~ 
depression brought back some of their ideas to a more im-
pressionable: iron and steel industry. 
The next factor which we have to consider is· the system of' 
a uniform delivered price for Plates and Section& which was 
established among the regional associations of' heavy s•teel-
makers: in the Unfted Kingdom after the 1914-1918:. war. By the 
end of' 1923 the organisation had more or less stabilised itself' 
and Great Britain and Northern Ireland were divided into seven 
regions~: in each of' these regions, which were fairly extensive:, 
a. "delivered•' price was fixed.. Consumers: w:ere .at liberty to· 
ob~ain supplies of' steel from any region, but with whatever 
firm they placed an order, the same regional price would be 
ch.arged, although prices. might, and often did, vary from region 
to r~gion. This-policy of' delivered prices f'or certain. grades 
of steel was continued in the 30's by the Iron and .Stee:l 
Fedez:aation under the supervision of' the Impo.~t ;Duties Advisory 
·the 
Commi tt.ee. The principal objection\:> to i:·t seems. to be hindrance 
" 
to locational shifts of the steel cons;uming industries; which 
might be occasioned QY such a system. Obviously from the nature 
of' the regional divisions the delivered price: arrangement en-
couraged the dispersion of' the consuming indus:tries:, as there was 
no cost advantage to be gained by situation close to a steelworks. 
At the same time,. if' it should ·be found that low cos-t production 
was possible in a previously undeveloped area the iron and .steel 
industry would be unable to attract consumera close to the point 
of' production, by virtue of the size of the regions. That such 
a locational shift might be mutually adv~tageous becomes apparent 
( 1) Op. c_i t •• 3J2·. 
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when it is realised that the main bulk of British steel production. 
in the past decade or two has been '~open-hearth basic!' steel, 
Which recruuires a }1igh proportion Of S'Crap •. Theref'ore,. a 
location remote from a steelworks would involve the transport of 
~ greater bulk of material in the caae: of at consuming industry 
which was: using a large amount of steel, both in col~cting its 
suppJ.ies' of s.teel and in returning its s~ap ~. the stee.lworks:. 
In f'act ,_ the prices charged in thisl countr~_ were not_ particularly 
low1 for low-cos,t distric.ts;: but under the " b~sing point system" 
which w:as_ adopted in the. U. ~;.A. a reduction of deli very costs was 
almos;t certain bec:aus.e this system encouraged the concentration 
of steel consumption. The American· steel consmning firm paid 
for its steel ex the nearest important producing ce~tre - or 
basing point, p]us; the transport costs •. Thus there would.be 
a na:tura'l tendency ·:eor firms to loc~te) themselves in rea:sonable 
pro~imity to the ba~ing points; and to acx similarly if. new 
centres of' steel. production! were opened up. "it is' a valid con-
clus-ion" write:s: s.R. Dennison in this cormection ·~(l) that the 
(British) sys:.tem shifts the emphSiSiis from nearness> to materials 
to proximity to markets; as the chief locational factor", but -·.he, 
also quotes els:ewhere (2)· the figure: of 16% as: the· ave~age costs 
of transport off scrap metail. to a- port f.o.b. a:s a percentage of 
the value f. o •. b. This is a significantly large percentage, an~ 
·even allow.·ing for a slight decrea~se when considering the home 
trade, it must be accepted that the delivered price system would 
bel likely to be inimica.J. to cros.t reduction in ~he newer centres 
of steel production such as: Lincolnshire and No~thamptonsbdre. 
Moreover, the very establishment of a uniform regional price is 
by implication, a bulwark against drastic re-organis·ation or r.e-
locstion, in tha:t the high-cost producing firms wo~d ten~ to 
shelter and embed themselves behind it. 
When 1921 came, ~he post~war boom had depart~d, and with its 
depart~e came ten difficult years f'or the iron and steel industry,· 
conspicuous only by the smal]ness of' the practical endeavours to 
(1) Op.cit. p.53. (2) Ibid. p.66. 
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improve the lot of the industry. Two schools of thought prevailed: . 
there were those who regarded recession as inevitable in view of 
the decline in the natural advantages, which had been enjoyed by 
the industry in the past, princip~:lly through the deterioration~ .. of· 
r.aw .. materia~ supp!lies. Those who supported this· view were in 
favour of concentrating on such special products, as the high-
grade steels of Sheffield which were unrivalled in quailii ty eJ.sewhere, 
. . 
or the acid steel of West Cumberland, a .. steel o"t the highest 
possible reliability, but in demand only when quality and not 
pri~e was held to be the criterion. A more optimistic standpoint 
was t.aken by those who advocated ra:dical recons>truction: they felt 
that, if' the industry would only loo·k to l.ts faulty organisation 
and pay more ,attention to tectnical im:Provements, it could fight· 
it$ way ~ck into the front ranks of world steel producers. In 
retrospect, a1. situation in which ~,(l) British firms nonnally put.· 
little ~side for depreciation, could rarel~pay their fixed 
interest diviClEm.ds, and the ~rdina··ry shareholders in heavy steel 
companies got nothing. 11 seemed to hold out little promise of 
progress in the direction urged by those who supported this 
second viewpoint. 
An empirical study of the fresh developments; in the industry 
up to the onset of' the 11Great · Depression11 _.in the 30's bears out 
I , , 
the. previous remarks;. From D.L.Burn, we have the dis:quie.tening 
information tha~•.(a) thel·.~~lifuination of plants was as uncommon in 
.,. .. ~ . 
. the decade as radicai transformation, so that the s.:t;ructure pattern 
of the industry remained from the sspect of ~ow cost loc~tions 
very much as it was in 1900, though the average·sizel of' plants 
had grown. 1.~ 'Of the s•tructUI'e ··pattern in general, however, there 
is evidence of' a tendency towards that rationalisation which .is 
antic.ipated in an earlier quotation from the P~E .• P. Report through 
a growth in the ~fze of' the average unit of' pr.oduction. ·~ ••• in the 
steel-melting division of' the indus>try there were in 1924 665 
open~hearth steel furnaces in the United Kingdom and the output 
·'' 
of steel ingots and castings amounted ·to 8. 2 million ... tons•, whereas 
{ 1) Burn. P. 430. { 2) Ibid p. 432 .• 
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in 1929 the number of furnaces had been reduced to 595 and 
the output increased to 9~ 6 million tons". (l) It must not be . 
overlooked·, however, that advancesi in fuel economy must acco1.mt, 
to an uncertain degree, for the increased output, so that it is. 
not legitimate to say that what we ~e observing is purely the 
outcome of larger plants s.quee·z.ing out smaJ.ler ones in favour of 
more advantageous location~. 
The one example of the development of a low cost location 
is that of Lysatgh t • s works.; at Norman by Park, scunthorpe, Which 
were subjected to a drastic reconst~uction in the late 20's 
and became the firs:t works in Great Britain to operate with no 
external fuel or power other than that provided by the coal 
which was; used in the-coke ovens: the fuel economie~ effected 
were compatible with _continental results which were well in 
·advance of the average achieved in this country at the time. 
No new connuon-grade steelmaking plants w.ere laid down during 
these years up to 1931, and of the two remaining large re-
constructions of note the formation of the Lancashire Ste~L ·:.. · ... :. _ . 
Corporat·io~ is interesting as an example of the regional 
specialis·ation as. a means of. reducing the costs of mrketing 
and di.stributing the finished products, upon which we. remarked 
earlier .. · Here, at Irlam 1~a number of older plantS:· have been 
closed down, and work ls now in progress for the construction 
of the most modern type of coke oven, steel rolling and billets 
and steel bars plant, with ultimately a rounding off of the 
complet~ process by the erection of blast furnaces. ( 2 ) ·~ The 
ore has to be. transported from some distance, mainly from Lines. 
and Northants•. and it might have been more economical to have 
used ·~s=emis.'~ from lower cost districts, but there is a big local 
market, especially fo.r wire rods; a lange p~oportion of the 
British manufacture ~f which is conducted by the Lancashire steel 
Corporation. It may be added that the "financial factor" as an 
(1) E •. D. McCallum. ·~·Britain in Depression" page 269. 
(2) Industrial· Survey of the Lanca'shire Area: 1932. Section on 
Steel Mel tin.g, Iron puddling, fUrnaces, rolling mills etc:. 
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influence on location comes on to the scene in Lancashire. 
The Bank of England sponsored the Irlam developments after 
reviewing its .Private survey of the iron and steel industry 
in the country; and it seems at least probable from the in-
du&.trial survey of the area that without this financial backing 
the indus:try would gradually have shifted from Lancashire as 
·~the record between 1923 and 193:0 suggests that it is tending 
to disappear altogether for unemployment has been rising, whilst 
the insured popula,tion and the numbers enployed have fallen'! ( 1) · 
The third and last recon~truction of any consequence in th~ 
decade before the world a~umP of 1930 toak.place at Oonsett-
one of the older centres of production which no longer retained 
i·ts earlier advantages ·of ore and coal situated on the site of 
production. Nevertheless good coking coal was available within~ 
a short haul, and transportation charges for conveying .the 
imported ores; from the coast to Oonsett, ·and the finished 
products in the reverse direction could not, have been signifi-
cant enough to induce a move towards the Tyne - a sugges~ion 
which had been rejected, al~hough Newcastle would have bee~ a 
profitable market for the company's coke oven gas. The steel-
w.orks and rolli~g mills w.ere entirely rebuilt then, on the old 
-
site: it may be that such·an old established firm did not desire 
to create the social upheaval which a locational shift might 
have occasioned to the life·of the area; nor to lose the skilled 
worker.s which time and tradition had concentrate'd in the· area', 
and it could af£ord to be more sentimental than most steelmakers 
in this respect for it possessed "vast· liquid resources" - an 
uncormnon phenqmenon in the industry at this period. . There were 
indications of the attractions of the l'yne to Consett a few years 
.before the 1939-45 war, however, when the Company financed a new 
~roject consisting of electric cu-e furnaces and roll.t.ing mills at 
Jarrow; and ere·cted its nwst modern coke ovens on the Tyne. 
In 1930, a 'Civil Research Commdttee of' the Cabinet' presided 
' 
over by Lord Sankey, produced a report on the iron and steel 
( 1.) Industrial Survey of the Lanc:ashire Area 1932. Section on 
Steel Melting, Iron puddling, furnaces:, rolling mills etc. 
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industry which, whilst ostensibllf. s:ecret, became well known in 
this country through the publication of a pamphlet by the 
Kolnische Zei tung of Germany. From this account, which seems 
to be·fairly reliable, the main conclusion of the Committee was. 
that ~ re-organisation should be pressed forward in the first 
instance vd. thoy.t a;. protective tat-iff for the industry - an issue 
which had been smoulderin~ over the past decade, and was urged 
with more force, of course, as the world slump toOk a sharper 
downward turn. If the re-organisation by i ts·elf did· not enable 
the industry to hold its place againat foreign competition, then 
the Committee w.ere prepared to see the introduction of protection 
for a period adequate for the recovery of the industry. Because 
. 
of its extremely important i~lications for locational change to-
wards a better· ( 1 ) ~i ting and grouping of the indus.try, a brief 
consideration of what protection might entail, must be given here. 
11Whilat there is·a certain presumption that an industry 
which: .. is struggling to come into existence W:ill, if it is given 
a chance, adopt the most suitable methods of organisation, there 
is considerable danger that the protection of an indu&try which 
has fallen into difficulties largely through its conservatism 
and lack of initiative will simply result in the perpetua:tion of 
the old f'aults"( 2 ) Professor Whale·seems to have had the iron and 
steel industry particularly in_ mind when he wrote this section of 
his book, and there is a crystallisatiom in ~- later: . .- passage of 
the fear which must surely have been in the background of the 
Civil Reaearch Committee's advocacy of re-organ;isation rather than 
ta-riffs. "The case ·(for a. "re:cons·.truction" tariff) would be 
stronger if the pro~lems.could be made effectively conditional 
on progress being made in re-organ:is~:ati.on. It is extremely 
(1} The word 'better' must be unders.tood only in a relative sense: 
·"during recent times, the relative importance of various loc:alising 
factors· has been changing much more rapidly than in the past•.so 
that causes which quite recently ex~~ted a decisive influence are 
now often o~ c;tui te small significance:,~-~-Beverth~less:, there were 
very many obv1ous'. examples of mal-locat1on .of the iron & steel 
i~dus,try at this s~age. t!.Er.P.Report.p.58 . . . 
( 2) P.Barrett Whale "Internat·ional Traden. 
difficult to contrive thia. Protection promised only for a short 
period would usually be of no use at all; and if its continuance 
is to be assured so long as the industry in quest~on makes reason-
able headway in solving its problems, some outside authority er 
tribunal must be assigned the almost impossible task of determining 
whether this condition is; fulfilled"(l). Instead of a radical 
re-organisation, the high cost producers would merely tend to 
perpetuate themselyes behind the tariff barrier, _and prices would 
remain as high as-ever. It may well be that the metho4 of 
reorganisation proposed by the Civil Reserwch Commi tt:ee - that 
of regional amalgamations and specialisations - would only have 
f'os,tered progressive mal-locations· of the industry, as Mr. Burn 
argues; (2) but in any case, the Bank of England would have been 
I 
required to sponsor~ the financ~ng of the scheme and that body was 
by now preoccupied with its own proble.ms; arising out of'· the 
depression. The situation then was favourable to those who wanted 
the tariff', and they won their case early in 1932, when a pro-
. . 
tective duty of' 33f/3% was imposed for three·months;, subsequently 
extended for a further three months; then for two years from 
October 1932, and finally in May 1934 the time limit was removed 
entirely - a chronological history illustrative of the fact ~hat 
tariff's are comparatively easy to impose, but extremely difficult 
to remove •. The remainder of-Professor Whale's: statement appears 
to have been equally prophetic, as we shall see. 
"•••• the Government,·the .Import Duties Advisory Committee 
and the Iron and Steel Federation all adopted a policy_which led, 
I agree "w.rites G.D.H.Cole (3)n to:Lsome~ .. :in.cre.ase.:::int average tec~nd.cal 
efficiency as well as to higher profits, but did ~o ·in such a way . 
. . 
as to limit expansion It 
•• •·• J From this stage on, we shall be con-
cern~d to discover whether there was· any justification for this and 
other ·remarks to the effect that having got their tariff, the f'ir.ms 
were in no hurry to build new plants and modernise the industry, 
(l)P.Barrett Whale "Internation.\Trade'~. · (2) Op.cit.p.442. 
(3) Op. a:i t. p. 28~ 
(1) 
( 2:) 
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for there is a prima facie assumptio~ (l) that this last 
decade of the period under review should witness the first 
large scale attempts towar·ds affecting ·~the ~upply to the: 
u·sing industries of the right products at the right IX' ices;,·~­
and ~ a sine qua! non to thi-s from ~ indus:try sit-uated Gin 
so far a$ this can ever be determinant) in-the right places. 
~or the first. two or three years after the impos·i tion of 
a tariff, there was only one> s-timulating project for a corn-
bined works: that was actually put into construction. This 
was the new works of stcrart & Lloyds Ltd. at Corb~ in Northampton-
shire .-'~perhaps the most interesting and important development 
in the_ depression perio.d11 ( 2 ). This had been planned in 1929, 
and the decision to go ahead with the work was made in November 
193·2; it therefore seems fairly safe ·to assume that the tariff 
·had a favourable influence in this instance; although it cel'tain-
ly was not the prime mover. This scheme was: the first large 
scale development of the Northamptonshire Ore Fields, and marked 
also a .revival. of the Bessei!Jlr basic process of steelmaking. 
Thus>, apart ·from the transport costs of the coaJl, all other 
raw materials could be assembled on the site and full advan_tage 
taken of the fuel economies yielded from a large integrate.d 
plant. Moreover,,Bessener basic steel is the cheapest kind of 
steel to produce. Taking this factor into account, and also 
an·earlier observation that transport-costs tend to dimind.sh as-
a product becomes mor.e "manufactured", it will be realised that 
transport costs to markets of the f1nished product - in this case, 
' 
tubes for a·ssernbling industries in the Birmingham area and for 
export - would not alter to any appreciable degree the advantages 
/ 
of the location. Finally, it may be noted that the Bankers 
t-he 
Industrial Development Company arrangedn£ 3 million financing of 
the Corb~ scheme.- Undoubtedly a happier choice than that made 
in Lancashire by the Bank of England. 
The rene'wal of the import duties was upon the recozmnendation of the 
I.D.A.c. made conditional upon th~ re~organisation of' the industry. 
~.D.McCallum op.cit. p.276. 
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One example of 11'a s~trong ·tendency to ·concentrate manufacture: 
near the sea:(l)u in s·outh Wales is provided by th~ctivities of 
Guest Keent & Baldwins, the only other firm in the immediate pc:s.,t-
tariff years to erect a new integrated plant. More strictly 
this was an example c;>f consolli.dation rather than of lo~.ational 
change, for the old site at cardif~ was chosen for the new works, 
but at the same time they closeddown the old works at the hill· 
site. of' Dowlaus, thus emphasising the significance of a coastal 
location. In South Wales there is an ample supply of coal at · 
hand, but ore has to be imported into the· district from the Mid-
lands or from overseas'. In addition, quantities o.f' pig iron 
mre drawn from Lincolnshire. As the sheet steel and tinplate 
sections of the industry, which form the bulk of' the South Wales 
. . 
product, were in a very backward condition,disintegrated. and old-
fashioned - and indeed, still are to a large extent - the Cardiff 
project can be considered as bei'ng at leas,t one ~mall step in the 
·right direction. Elsewhere, ·there was a certain mnount of re-
construction, adaptati9ru and instaalation of new equipment, but 
nothing to occas,j,on interest in a study of the loc.ation of the 
industry. A contemporary writer, observing the work tha~ was 
being carried out under individua~l in::l. tiative at the time· comments 
that ·~ there are· signs that the industry finds it dif'f'icul t to 
carry through voluntarily the large sca,le r~-a!djustments which are 
expected of' it in the interests of' efficiency by the general public, 
The Government and the iron and steel consuming indus;tries•'.(2~ .He 
cites; the National Committee of' Ipon & Steel Manufacturers which, 
under the auspices of the I.D.A.c., was set up to make proposals 
for the re-organisation of the industry. After two years of' dis-
cussion, reports - and what in retrospect frankly looks like 
11 tarif'f haggling11 - the result emergent. was no~ a scheme for the ·re-
organisation of iron and steel but for re-organisation of' the 
central body, henceforth to be kno'~ as the British Iron & steel 
(l) Industrial Survey of' South Wales 1932. 
( 2.) E·.n.McCalJlmn op .• cit. p. 277. 
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Federation, s.trong~r in character than the National Federation 
and (one year later) with an Independent Chairman. Collective 
action came first in the dealings of the Federa~ion, as newly 
constituted,with the Continental Steel C~rtel. Despite ·a 33~% 
tariff, continental steel makers were still able to co~ete with 
Brit~sh firms in the home market: ~n eloquent revelation of the 
high costs \Vthich continued to prevail throughout the British 
indus·try, with aU.l too few exceptions. So the tariff was raised 
to 50%. and a quota fixed for continental imports; at a preferential 
rate, whilst the British Iron & Steel Corporation was ·es;tablished 
to deal Yll'i th these imports as a subsidiary of the Federatio_n. 
It was felt by the Import Duties Advisory Committee that with 
this additional support the industry was in a pos'ition which 
11would encourage the continuance of' the work of r5-e1uipment and 
re-organisation to maximum efficiency, which were now being delayed 
by the ~certain future, but had otherwise been proceeding satis-
factorily (l"),~ but very soon af'ter this in July 1935 there came 
a development which brought to the forefront an issue which had 
been in the uneasy background since the Government had first come. 
to the aid of the industry in 1932: the s~ate as an influence 
upon location. 
In 1933, Richard Thomas & Co.re-opened their Radbourne Steel 
Works_at Scunthorpe, Lines. for the manufa~ture of billets destined 
for rolling mills in Newport., (Mon.) In July 1935 they decided to 
erect a~. strip mill at Radbourne,. presumBibly impressed _by the 
economies which could be gained from the use.of' the Lincolnshire 
o\'e~ .· . . . 
a¥eas 1n conJunction w1th an 1ntegrated process of manufacture. 
The Chairman, Sir w~.Firth, took the line that '!it would be absurd 
and against the national interest to build modern W.ork8 in South 
Wales. Northamptonshire and Lincolnshire were undoubtedly the 
natural centres for the economic production of British steel •• u(2) 
But at·this time, the Commissioner for Depressed Areas was striving 
to restart the Ebbw Vale Company in .south Wales and the Prime 
Min~_~ter, Lord Baldwin, persuaded Richard Thomas to take over this 
(1) D.L.Burn.p.457 referring to Cmd.4851(1935) & Cmcil..5201(1936). 
(2)''The Times 11 _May 27th~ 1936. 
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concern, and to build a new integrated sheet rolling works there -
a plant which was soon to ~roduce .30% of t~e British output of 
· tinplSJte. No doubt, Richara Thomas: were acting commen~ably in 
crea-rting fresh employment in ai depressed area: but as the Ebbw · 
·Vale plant was to roll and tin steel ·sheets, this could not but. 
aggravate the situation in their previous locations at swansea 
and Llanelly - both coastal s.d. tea, it is~- to be noted. As Sir Wm. 
Firth so vehemently complained Ebbw Vale was a; hiE¥1: cost loe:ation, 
and indeed . a reversa1l of that ·~shifting of location f'rom the hills 
to the s:ea~1 which has been no1;iiced previously, inspired in part 
by the prospec1s of adequate scrap supplies. Richard Thomas 
owned sites in Lincolnshire and Northamptonshire, and D.L.Burn 
has estimated that the difference in cost of'.making pig iron in 
the la~ter a~ea and in the Ebbw Vale were probably about 5/- per 
ton in 1936, su:f'ficient in itself to prejudice the a:dvis.abili ty 
of the Ebbw Vale project ·even on the original estimate of' 150,000 
tons of' sheets and tinplates a year; more so for the much larger 
output which was· event~ally attained. The f'irm was given a 
concession by the local rating authorities, but it seems unlikely. 
that this would be a substantial f'actor,certainly not in fact nor 
for such a re~son that high rates create the presumption that the 
services provided and the local admin·tstration generally will be 
of' a poor quality. {l) In 1937 Richard Thomas found the costs of 
expansio~ at Ebbw Vale unexpectedly high, and the Bank of ~land 
had to s:tep in with assistance ·~ since the slightest possibility 
of' failure after the public had subscribed £ 9 million was too 
serious to be contemplated.'~ ( 2 ) Thus, c1espite the comparatively 
high costs of' production because of' the tranaport charges involved 
both f'or raw ll}aterials and marketing 11 i t seems; inevitable that stee:l 
sheet production will tend to become concentrated at Ebbw Vale and 
Shotton(Cheshire) to the detriment for instance of Stockton and 
Glasgow•~ (3? ~ 
(l)As suggested by the South Wales Development Council in evidence 
before Royal Cormn.ission on Distribution of Indus.trial Population. 
(2) P.E'.,P.Report p. 23. (3) Ibid. 
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Irmnediately after the Ebbw Vale project had been started 
there. ar.ose. a further controversy which was to lead to a much 
closer supervision of the planning for furth~r expansion· of the 
indus·try by both the Federation and the. Gov~rnment. The propose_d 
integrat-ed plant at Palmer's Shipyard, Jarrow, became~- one of 
the main· planks of suppo~t for thos.e critics who accused the iron 
and steel industry of a negative dilatory policy behin~ the tariff 
barrier. The plan was to make steel by the Thomas process, which 
as we have seen was the cheapest kind of steel to produce, with 
suitable. ores, and required less labour than the open-hearth 
process. st\~ts & Lloyds were willing to sell ores from their 
Northarnptonshire sites for the purpose. The· s·emis and small 
sections which it v1.as in tended to produce co.uld the-refore have 
been sold ·at l:ow prices, w.i th a market on the dooil"step moreover; 
but the syndicate who were interested in the project could not 
acquire either the financial backing they nee:ded or the :r;r omise: 
of ·marketa:, through the Federation •. Whilst this stage of the· 
procee:dings was being sU.owly ena:cted,Dorman Longs_ and Cargo· Flee:t, 
also situated in the North East, cors';·tructed new rolling mills of 
a type s:imilar to what was intended. for Jarrow. Good trade 
favo~e~ these patchwork additions to existing plants., but they 
effectively ruled out the JaTrow scheme, despite a: good deal of 
political agitation-;; and·~ t s:eems fairly certain that opposition 
from other stee;lmakers• was, the: predominant ele11;1ent in the dis-
cont·inuation of the project." Unanimity might· have been re:ached11 (1) 
decl&.red the Iron & Steel Federation in a revealing senten.ce ·~upon 
the principle of a co-oper~tive and integrated plant if located 
upon the Tee~s:e. 1 ~ . Jarrow was not forgotten, however, and later in 
1936 another scheme was finally approved, with Consett providing_ 
the capital. An electric steel-melting plant was to be erected 
with rolJ!ing mill.s to handle its produets and to re-roll semis 
from Consett. 
In its report on the pr~sent position and future ·development· 
of the iron. and steel indus:try ( 2 ), the Import.· Duties' Advisory 
( 1) ·~Times•~ July 7th, 1936. (2) Omd.5507 1937• 
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Co:mmd.t~ee· defined its supvisory scope as covering '~loc·ation in 
relation to sources> of rax1 materials, and markets, balance· between 
home and imported materials;, centralised versus scattered I?lants. 1 .~ · · 
The Federation had-, meanwhile, assembled a commit tee to exar,nine 
a-ll schemes; of' expansion in the industry, before submitting 1h em 
to the Goverrunent agency; and even to recommend expansions where 
they seemed to be desirable. The first fruits of this closer co-
operation which one ·gathers; :had been thrus·t upon the tw.o bodies: 
are to be seen in four projects which had been approved. Jarrovr 
has already been discuss:ed. A second wasi for the erection of' 
blas-t furnaces, _coke ovens; and steel furnaces\ at Frodingham, Lines. 
by the United Steel Company. This proposition could be regarded 
' .. 
as a hqpeful omen, s:o far as it went; but unf'ortuna1tely, the 
finishing stages> were· to be carried out at United Steels·' ·Rothe:i!'ham 
. . 
Works for onward transmission to consumer.a in the Birmingham area. 
T.h~ ra~ical change. needed would have been·to concentrate the 
rol]ing mills; at Frodingham as: well, it having been alre:ady 
stress·ed that Sheffield was an inappropriate locat-ion for mass 
production. steel making except where a strong local demand was 
to be met. Furthermore this arrangement. entailed a:dditi~nal 
transport costs with all the concomitant possibilities of. dis-
rupting the even flow of production which might be expected if 
the pros·es~es· of manufacturing had been combined. The econ.omies 
of' integra"t·ion must not be over empha:s~ised, but here was a si-tuation 
known to be f'ayourable to-combined works, with every expectation 
of' long, economical ·~rl.Ul.s 1.~. United Stee:ls' own Chairman, Sir. w~ 
Benton· Jones, intima~ed that ·~·the steel industry in the :future is 
like'ly to :find :fUller emploYinent than in the past'~ a:s early as 
O~tober'l934; so that reluctance to abandon a comparatively new 
works·: despite its appa;rent anaQhronism must be the conclusion 
reached :for the retention of' the Rotherham works. 
In 1932, a responsible industrial inquiry made the gloomy 
statement that "(l) unless there is sonie drastic re-organis-ation 
••• 
the prospec~s· ( o:f the pig iron s.ection o:f the indus;try) are. dreary 
in the extreme.·~ .. Scotland was faced with its own peculiar 
(1) D.1dustrial; Survey , . s·outh West Scotland. 
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problems:: the rapi~ exhaustion o:r the Lanarkshire Splint co a] 
and local ores·. left a>ll the blast furnaces many miles from the 
c~t, just as the industry was beginning to rely more and more 
A 
upon imported ores •. Thus, the high cos,ts; of' ~cottish pig iron 
coupled w·i th the necessity of' importing iron ore: or pig iron from 
the continent or other parts of' Britain put the Scottish steel-
makers'. at a relative disadvantage ·~ a1lthough the s,teelworks 
themselves are on the whole as efficient as- any in this coun~ry(l)·~ 
In 1929 ·there were discussions among the Scottish Steelmakers 
concerning the establishm~nt of a ~e~ combined plant. on the Clyde, 
near shipyard's; so that foreign ores could be unloaded direct 
from ships to the works and with the intention of suppa.ying coke 
oven gas to Glasgow• The scheme was not carried through, however, 
possiblU because of the high capital costsl involved. In 
.addition to pig iron the Scottish ·_industry uses a very high 
proportion of scrap, how.ever., and is fa.:vour.ed by a good local 
. 
supply of this;; and for .markets • the bulk of the indus-try need 
look no further than the nearby shipbuilding yards; and heavy 
engineering works. Technical improvement and concentration and· 
a regular supply of ra.w material, therefore, were - and s.till. are -
in the main interest of the Scrottish Steel Indus;try •. In the light. 
of the foregoing, the third project approved by the Import Duties 
Advisory Cormni tt.ee reveals yet another example of reluct.ance to 
abandon old equipment and to make the radical change necessary 
for low.est poss:ible cost production. The Colvilles·. grou;p which 
brought together approximately 4/Sths of the Scot~ish stee~ 
capacity in 1936, added blast furnaces; and coke ovens. to their 
steelworks; at Clydebridge>. to supply the~~ 'Dulk of sc9tt.ish pig iron 
requirements; but not much concentration was effected, and in fact 
·~ in steel-making and s'teel rolling there remains a large prograrmne 
of regrouping, s~ra,.pping and rebu.ildin,g. ·~ ( 2 ). Wh~tever the 
Indus>trial Survey, South west Sco1;land. 
Indus;try and EmplJoyrnent in Scotland Cmd. 7125 1947 p. 28. 
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pretext ~ and this was the decade when the social costs 6~ 
locational changes .were coming into prominence and possibly 
being used to justify policies that lacked an economic sanction -
the· problem was not squarely f'aced and the question remains: 11 
whether the new plant should be mainly grouped at the more 
favourable of' the sites already occupied by steelworks, or built 
at an entirely nevt.riversid6J site low.er down. the Clyde•'~(l) 
Las,tly ~ John suinmers of' Shott.on, near Ches,ter, were 
recommended to go ahead vri th the bui'lding of' a continuous strip 
mill for· the manufacture of st~el sheets;, a project principally 
intended to replace old equipment. This f'irm had moved to 
Chester at the turn of' the century when its: busin\ess was aJ.mos.t 
wholly in export markets;, so that proX:imi ty to a gre:at Port like 
Liverpool was undoubtedly an asset. At the time, the industry 
as ~.whole: was dubious about the lo~ g~ade ores; of' the East 
Midlands, but the teclmological discoveries: of the intervening. 
years. accentuated the relsti vely higher costs which were ~:ertaint 
to obtain in Chester, when the raw materials had to be transported 
from Lines. or.Northants. with a loss of the economiea of an· 
integra-ted plant·. Here also, the Import Duties Adv;isory Committee 
I 
n.o.ted with satisfaction that the balance of ezqployment was not 
being disturbe~; and indeed there seemed.little likel~ood of 
disturbing John Summers; from their location ~or rruany years ahead, 
f'or the s.cheme was supp.orted by a large smn of new capital put up 
by the United Steel and the Bankers Indus-trial Development Coy. 
Second thoughts on Shotton are illuminating: 1~i t is recognised 
that the Shott on plant :i:s not si tua:ted in so f!BIVourable a pos,i tion. 
for the a:saembly of the ra:w materials1 coking, coal and ore, as some 
of' the other coastal plants, and it is "V·isua,lised tha~t this plant 
will operate on a. ra~her higher proportion· of scrap than for the 
country as a whole:( 2 ) ·~ 
(l)Indus·try and Emplloyment·. in Scotland Cmdl.. 712-5 1947 p. 28. The 
second alternative is adopted as the long ter.m end in view Cmd.6811 
1946. 
(~)Report by the British Iron & Steel Federation ·1946 Cmd.6811. 
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Offsetting against this; the technical desirability of using 
' . . higher grade imported ores :f"or modern steel making, ·it atill appears 
to remain an open question whether this plant could be said to be 
I • • 
operating in the rest poss;ible location. A familiar attitude of 
unwillingness to abandon a. 'going conce-rn' is observable although 
perhaps more justified in this instance than in others which have 
been described. 
This "brings us to the end of the major schemes which were put 
into .effect during the P3 riod. Sir Wm.Larke~ the Direetor of the 
·Iron & Steel Federation gave a figure of' £ 10 millions a year 
spent on 'modernisation' between 1934 - 39, but the recent White 
Paper(l) quotes £6,2.50,000 a year on ·~construe$ional work'~, the 
disparity between the two ~igures being due of course to the fact 
_that the former included ordinary replacement o~· obsolescent plant. 
Despite the great increas.e; in efficiency obtained through this com-
parat:i. veiy small expenditure ·~moat was achieved by_ improving details 
and parts of' plants, relatively little: by concentration and tran-
sla1:ion:•~ ( 2.), howeve:u. • -fhe old problem of a :trundamental lack of' 
balance between one stage of the indu!$.try and the next remain.t. By 
1938 about one third of all. the ore used in pig iron was' imported; 
scrap· formed 57i% of' the steel :furnace charge,and nearly 800~000 
tons of' that wa~ imported i~eP~ed. 6oke supplies were: inadequate 
due to a lack of' coke ovens., both in numbers and in -t efficiency. 
Then the inadequacy of' the blast f:urnaces made pig_· iron supp]:ies in-
.. 
sufficient to meet the needs of' the s~teel furnaces. Our semi-
finished steel ·output could not fully supply the c~~ity ·of' the 
finis~i~g sections and quantities: had to be imported. Only in the 
finishing stages was the capacity adequate, and here there waa a 
chronic surplus cap~city except. at the height of' a boom. Tal?le 5 
demonstrates plainly enough how the distribution of' ~eel production 
remained almos:t the same in 1937 as it was' in 1929. 
(1) Cmd.68ll p.35. (2) Burn p.483~· 
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TABLE 2• 
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF STEEL PRODUC.TION ( ~CEW!'AGES). 
1913i 1"929 ,. 193:5 1937 
North East Coast 28 23 21 22 
s·.wales & .Monmouth 23 24 19 20 
Scotland 19 16 ]3 15 
Sheffield lJL 13> li4· ll3i 
Lines •. 3' 8 ]]] ]0 
Lanes. Ches:. 7 8 9 8 
Black country 5 6 7' ·5 
No~th West Coast 5 2 .. 3 3 
Northants a) .0 2: 3 
Reticence on the part of the in&ustry to develop the Lincolnshire · 
and Northair,lptonshire ore f':ields' may be advanced as·. one reason 
for t~e undue reliance upon imported ores·; but it would be im-
~ . 
poss·ible and' quite impractable to centre all produc.tion in these 
~ . 
areas:. If' we ·were s'itting down to plan ·a st·eel indus·try :from 
scr.atch, we would probably locate its main production centres 
very di:f':f'erently from their present positions. But things being · 
as they are·, even :from the narrow technical ·point of' view, any. 
savings in the:: actual cos't~: of' produc.tion Ill\lSt be countered partiall~ 
by the increased cos:t of' transport to the market and this applies 
.. particularly to· the export market when the main home ore :fields 
are situated inland. "A limit is set on the extent to which 
additional produ~tion should be.developed on·a·home ore sit~ by 
the extra carriage incurred if a disproportionate wnount of'_steel 
. (1) . . 
is produced in one: locat.l.on • ·~ . Moreover as D.L.Burn points 
out (2)•~· to promote long period stability there must be some 
releDtively high-cost producjjion us·ing foreign ores.·~ The social 
implications of the \:Videspread upheaval of' an important basic . 
industry are too great to be lightly ·i.gnored, despite the fact 
that increasing mechanisa.tion, .. has Jl.oosened the bond which a 
skilled labour force maintained in the past, ~d laid more stress 
upon general intelligence and acil.'aptabili ty. Burn stresses material 
(1) Cmd •. 6811 ·p.l2. (2) Op.cit p. 505. 
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assembling costs as the chief' cons:-ide·ration,-· to be borne in 
mind when determing location. This brings us back to the transport 
factor under another name. For all pr(:!:ctic:al purposes marlcets-
I 
must be taken as immobile, contrary to his assertion, but we can 
certad.nly agree that where the choice of a location is·. balanced 
between the transport cos-ts of' the raw materials. to the centre of' 
production and the_delivery costa. f'rom·the centre to the market,' in 
all other than1 very exceptional cases,., the former would take 
precedence. 
The a:rg'Wllent thUs· leads d..a to aceept the validity of' each 
region· as f'ar as possible getting its raw mateFials·. from the most 
sui table. place and s:elJLing f'or its mC?st localised market. -- ThU.s 
the ~orth ~ast, ~cotland, ~outh Wales, .~ancs. and the North West 
coa's:t should aim at supplying either their ovm industrial hi'rt er-
land or the export market, f'or which they are~ comparatively well-. 
placed. Lines. and Northants should concentrate on the Midlands 
·and home market. Obvious exceptions occur .to the mind; it_ would 
f'or exam;ple b~ stupid to suggest that Sheffield should be barred 
f'rom the export market \Vi th her high grade special s tee:ls·. 
The broad trends ait work in the re-location af the iron anlili 
steel indus;try are dis.cernible, although the-y were not explicitly 
recognised by either the Federation or the I .D. A. c •. before the 
war: on the _one hand, there is the concentration upon the: home 
ores:, sui table f'or making -low and medium grades of' steel, on the 
other, the growing importance of' coastal sites· where foreign ores 
can be eas~ly handled and higher g~ade qualities of' steel produced. 
In both cases there is a:. move towards increasing integration of' 
plants; certainly this ~ntegra~ion could be carried too f'ar, but 
this consideration is not one of' the industry's immediate problems. 
Integration implies in general an increase in the_ average size of' 
plant; and though this was happening ·during the inter-war ye·ars, 
there was no· growth comparable to that of foreign rivals. There. 
seems little doubt that the development of' quat& schemes behind 
a pro~ective tariff', coupled :with the great c:os·.t of' providing new 
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·capital e!quipment f'or an indus:try notoriously s:usceptible to booms· 
and slumps, militated against a progressive locational p,olicy. 
While it was possible to produce ID-Ulrant:eed if limited quanti.ties·. 
of' steel within the caTtel framework. of' ·the ~ron and Steel Federation, 
aided by the imperfections of competition, there was no incentive 
for producers'. to scrap and modernise on the sca;le which "the national 
interest" mi.ght have beent held to demand and which the Sankey Com-
mittee would like to have seen. " Predqminantly the policy of. patching•~ 
. . 
prevailed f'rom 1919-1939. A drastic mov.e in such an indus:try en-
tails; a. hundred and one vi tal decis:ions: one r:£ the mos·t important 
capita~ assets of' a f'irm - though it does nat appear anywhere in its 
balance sheet - is the f'act that it f'orrns part of' an established 
• 
community. The houses, where its \Yorkers live; are nearby, road·s 
and railways are arranged to handle its goods, the-local authority 
provides .all the thousands· of' incidents]_· services: for ·the company 
itself and for the· community of' which it forms a part. These 
intangible ·assets do not lend themselves to precise formulation 
·they must be calculated again f'or ·each and every case. And yet .can 
they be legitimately disregarded from the cost of' producing iron and 
steel'? 
· In the last analysis, the economist gives his. approval to a new 
.location on the basis of' the combinat:iion of' factors which will yield 
the low.est cost of the finished product to the, cons~er over the long 
period. In his absorption with the number of transport miles f'rom 
raw material sources to plant, and f'rom plant to markets, with 
optimwn S\iZe and technical efficiency, with production and a steady 
flow of factors, he may tend to overlook that society ·~must regard · 
' 
. economic interests as' one element in lif'e, not as· the·· whole of life. 
It must so organise its indus¢ry that the instrumental character of' 
economic activity is emphasised by its subordination to the social 
purpose for vrhich it is carried on. 11 ( 1 ) But with problems of' location, 
we are not yet dealing with an element f'or ·which precise rules can be 
laid down and elevated to 'laws'; and .if' we accept T~vmey's di~tum as 
(l) R. H. T<t.lmey. "The Ac:;:quisitive Society". p. 241. 
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a criterion, we still have to master the vast problem of embodying 
technical progress; into acceptable ins:ti tutional forms. The 
greater the emphasis: up~n social organisa·tion, the greater the 
onus which·is placed upon the exponent af locational problems: 
no indus .. try has such a need of wider vis·.ion~. in this respect than 
iron and steel. 
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A p·· P E: N D I. x· I a 
MAINf STAGES OF IRON!" & S'rEEL PRODUCTI.ON 
- . 
from G!-. 1).; H. -C.ole (slightly amended). "Why Nationalise Steel '1 11 
New Statesman & Nation Pemphlet. 
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